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INTRODUCTION
Reverse engineering of computer programs is a widely-practiced,
industry-accepted way of achieving several different objectives. Often
the purpose of reverse engineering is to develop an interoperable
program. Other purposes include customizing a program for the user’s
needs, fixing bugs, detecting infringement, or simply studying a
program. These purposes might be mixed. For example, a company
will frequently reverse engineer a competitor’s new program; first, to
see if it infringes on any of the company’s own programs, but beyond
this, to observe, for example, how the competitor dealt with a constraint
imposed by industry standards for similar programs. Even if the
company never incorporates these observations into one of its own
programs, the act of reverse engineering itself spurs innovation. Like
music, computer programming is a performing art (the performers are
machines), and, like composers, programmers analyze how programs
written by other people perform in order to hone their own creative
skills.
Despite its widespread application, there is currently some
uncertainty as to the lawfulness of reverse engineering in the United
1
States.
Computer programs are copyrighted works, and reverse
engineering necessarily entails making copies of an entire program,
2
thereby infringing on the reproduction right of the copyright owner.
Courts have consistently held, though, that when a defendant has a
legitimate purpose and no other means of accessing the unprotected
3
elements of a program, reverse engineering constitutes fair use. Under
1. Elsewhere, the lawfulness of reverse engineering computer programs has also been
called into question. See Céline M. Guillou, The Reverse Engineering of Computer Software
in Europe and the United States: A Comparative Approach, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
533 (1998); Aashit Shah, UK’s Implementation of the Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the
EU Copyright Directive:
An Analysis, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2004dltr0003.html.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000). Reverse engineering might also run up against contract
and licensing claims, because a program is often transferred under an agreement that
explicitly forbids the licensee/purchaser to reverse engineer the program. See Lydia Pallas
Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner
Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 508–12 (2004) (reviewing the
doctrines of unconscionability and preemption as they apply to clickwrap licenses). This
Comment will not address contract and licensing claims, but will focus solely on claims
brought under the Copyright Act and the DMCA.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518
(9th Cir. 1992).
[W]e conclude based on the policies underlying the Copyright Act that disassembly
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the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which prohibits the
circumvention of “a technological measure that effectively controls
4
access to a [copyrighted] work,” reverse engineering does not fair as
well. Computer programs are considered “technology” within the
5
meaning of the DMCA. Furthermore, “circumvention” is defined in
the DMCA as descrambling, decrypting, or otherwise avoiding,
bypassing, removing, deactivating, or impairing—in short, reverse
engineering—a technological measure without the authority of the
6
copyright owner. The DMCA does provide an exemption for reverse
7
engineering “for the sole purpose of . . . interoperability.” But the
exemption is beset with ambiguities and too narrowly crafted to
8
accommodate the many different purposes of reverse engineering.
This Comment argues that, in light of Congress’s express intent to
codify the settled law regarding reverse engineering under the
Copyright Act, a court should resolve the ambiguities in the DMCA’s
reverse engineering exemption in favor of the defendant. In addition,
courts should develop a “fair access” defense for reverse engineering
undertaken for purposes that do not involve interoperability, but rather
enable other reasonable, fair-use-defensible uses of computer programs.
Part I of this Comment briefly describes the practice of reverse
engineering. Part II summarizes how courts have dealt with reverse
engineering under the Copyright Act. Part III discusses how courts
should deal with reverse engineering under the DMCA. To begin, Part
III considers the legislative history of the DMCA. Next, Part III looks
closely at the reverse engineering exemption that Congress provided in
§ 1201(f) of the DMCA. This Comment discusses three ambiguities a
court must resolve in order to apply § 1201(f): (1) the scope of the
reverse engineer’s task (Scope), (2) whether a reverse engineer may
of copyrighted object code is, as a matter of law, a fair use of the copyrighted work if
such disassembly provides the only means of access to those elements of the code
that are not protected by copyright and the copier has a legitimate reason for
seeking such access.
Id.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
5. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 317 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff’d, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (“DeCSS, a
computer program, unquestionably is ‘technology’ within the meaning of the [DMCA].”).
6. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
7. § 1201(f)(1).
8. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1106
(2003) (commenting that “the explicit exceptions to the circumvention provisions have been
correctly criticized as narrow and shortsighted, failing to anticipate any new or unexpected
reason that users might legitimately have for needing access to a work”).
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embed a circumvention tool in a new, interoperable program without
9
violating the “anti-trafficking” provisions of the DMCA (Tools), and
(3) whether a court must establish the noninfringing character of a new,
interoperable program before it applies the reverse engineering
exemption (Character). Finally, Part III argues that the DMCA leaves
room for courts to develop a “fair access” defense for reverse
engineering that is justifiable for reasons that do not involve
interoperability. The Comment discusses how precedent for a fair
10
access defense may be found in two recent appellate court opinions,
specifically in the courts’ interpretation of the words “access,”
“protection,” and “authority” in § 1201(a). The Comment goes on to
suggest three factors courts should weigh when considering the fair
access defense: (1) whether the access in question led to what
traditionally would be considered a fair use of the program, (2) whether
an inherent limitation in the market led to the defendant’s need to use
self-help to gain access, and (3) whether the nature of the plaintiff’s
program is such that it deserves only relatively weak protection under
the DMCA.
I. REVERSE ENGINEERING OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The Supreme Court has defined reverse engineering as “fair and
honest means . . . by starting with the known product and working
backwards to divine the process which aided in its development or
11
manufacture.” In concept, reverse engineering of computer programs
is little different from the reverse engineering that takes place in many
12
To draw again on the analogy suggested above, a
other contexts.
programmer reverse engineering a computer program is like a composer
who decides to analyze a piece of music written for a symphony
orchestra. Perhaps the composer has been asked to write a piece in a
similar style; perhaps she simply likes the piece and wants to understand
why it moves her. The composer can (1) read what others have written
about the music, (2) listen to a recording of the music, (3) transcribe the

9. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1).
10. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
11. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
12. See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Reverse Engineering of Software: Separating Legal
Mythology from Actual Technology, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 331, 334–35 (1992) (comparing reverse
engineering to recreating a recipe from the taste of the dish, deciding how to repair a car from
the sound coming from under the hood, and diagnosing a medical condition from the
patient’s description of the symptoms).
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recorded sounds, and, finally, (4) listen again, going back over the
transcription and making other structural diagrams of how the music
unfolds. The composer will need to repeat the last two steps several
times, working out details of instrumentation, articulation, rhythm,
phrase structure, and harmonic progression, to conceptualize as
precisely as possible the sounds she hears. In the end, of course, the
transcription and diagrams will merely represent what the composer
thinks makes the music sound the way it does. But, in the process of
making the diagrams, the composer will have formed an idea of what
elements of the music are critical to its style, and what is the source of its
emotional power.
A programmer who wants to know more about how a computer
program operates has four ways to learn about the program, which
14
roughly parallel the four ways a composer can study a piece of music.
The programmer can (1) read the product manual or other technical
information available on the program, (2) run the program on a
computer to observe what it does, (3) use a decompiler to translate all
or part of the ones and zeros of the program’s machine-readable object
code into human-readable words and mathematical symbols known as
15
source code, and, finally, (4) make a “dynamic examination” of the
program’s code, decompiling parts of the code while the program is
16
running. The process of reverse engineering might be an end unto
17
itself. In addition, the programmer might use the information gathered
during steps three and four, for example, to diagnose a bug in the
program, develop a new, interoperable program, or use as the basis for
an infringement suit against the company that made the program.
Every time a computer program is run, “intermediate” copies of the
entire program are made in the computer’s random access memory

13. Assume that a copy of the score is not available. Even if the score were available,
however, the composer would need to go through the steps outlined here (substituting the
score for a transcription) to come to an understanding of how the music was put together.
14. See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 843, 846 (1994) (outlining the four ways to reverse engineer computer
programs); see also Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599–601
(9th Cir. 2000) (describing the process of reverse engineering).
15. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514–15 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992)
(describing source code, object code, and decompilers).
16. Johnson-Laird, supra note 14, at 846.
17. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 346 (“Full time professional programmers
probably indulge in reverse engineering at least once a week as part and parcel of their
normal job.”).
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(RAM). Decompiling necessarily entails making multiple intermediate
copies. And yet, just as a composer would learn little about how a piece
is put together if she were merely to read what others have written
about the music and to listen to a recording (steps one and two), so too
would a programmer learn little about the inner workings of a computer
program if she were merely to read what others have written about the
19
program and to observe what tasks it performs on a computer screen.
A programmer must be able to read and perform a dynamic
examination of the code (steps three and four)—and must, in the
process, be able to make copies of the program—no matter what the
purpose of reverse engineering.
Judging from the cases that have been decided, the purpose of
reverse engineering is most often to make a new, interoperable
program. No doubt this generalization is skewed by the fact that
reverse engineering in other contexts does not make its way to court.
Broadly speaking, though, programmers reverse engineer for two
reasons: to analyze how a program operates and to analyze why a
20
program is not operating properly. Behind both of these reasons lies
the fact that much of what goes on when a computer program operates
21
is not normally visible. Furthermore, even what does become visible
through reverse engineering presents an incomplete picture of how and
22
why a program operates as it does.
Reverse engineering merely

18. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 14, at 894 (quoting MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993)) (“[RAM is] a computer component in
which data and computer programs can be temporarily recorded. . . . It is a property of RAM
that when the computer is turned off, the copy of the program recorded in memory is lost.”).
19. See id. at 846–47 (arguing that documentation on computer programs is invariably
inadequate and that “the only option guaranteed to provide accurate, complete information is
to examine the software itself”).
20. See id. at 846 (stating that the two reasons to reverse engineer are, first, “to
understand how a computer program really works” and, second, “to understand why a
program really does not work”).
21. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The
need to disassemble object code arises, if at all, only in connection with operations systems,
system interface procedures, and other programs that are not visible to the user when
operating . . . .”).
22. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 14, at 896–97.
Reverse engineering does not lay bare a program’s inner secrets. . . . The inner
secrets of a program, the real crown jewels, are embodied in the higher levels of
abstraction material such as the source code commentary and the specification. This
material never survives the process of being converted to object code. As the inner
secrets of a program are not in the object code, reverse engineering cannot lay them
bare.
. . . In other words, reverse engineering is almost entirely an additive process,
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facilitates the analytical, creative thinking programmers must engage in
to stay connected to the performance aspects of their art.
II. REVERSE ENGINEERING UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT
The status of reverse engineering under the Copyright Act is
intimately bound-up with the status of computer programs as
protectable under copyright law.
As explained above, reverse
engineering entails making intermediate copies of the entire computer
program. Thus, the reverse engineer necessarily infringes on the
23
reproduction right of the copyright owner of the program. However,
not every aspect of a computer program is copyrightable. When the
purpose of reverse engineering is to analyze a program in order to study
the uncopyrightable aspects of the original, courts have upheld the
reverse engineer’s right to make intermediate copies under the
24
affirmative defense of fair use.
Courts have grappled with how to distinguish the copyrightable and
uncopyrightable aspects of computer programs. Congress expressly
extended copyright protection to computer programs in 1980, when it
added “computer program” to § 101 of the Copyright Act: “A
‘computer program’ is a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
25
result.” As this definition suggests, computer programs are protectable
with the reverse engineer adding his or her knowledge and experience to the meager
information contained within the object code.
Id.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000). The Copyright Act provides that it is not infringement
for someone who owns a computer program to make RAM copies in the normal course of
using the program. Id. § 117(a)(1). Courts have rejected the argument that § 117 excuses
copies made during reverse engineering. See, e.g., Sega, 977 F.2d at 1517–18.
24. Fair use is a judicially-created doctrine, codified in § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act,
that provides that a use of a copyrighted work “for purposes such as criticism, comment, new
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Section 107 includes a list of four
factors for courts to consider in determining whether a particular use is a fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Id.; see 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05
(2005) (discussing the fair use doctrine).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Legislative history reveals that Congress already intended
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as “literary works.” The lines of code are “statements or instructions,”
akin to sentences in a book. This analogy is limited, however, because
unlike sentences in a book, which are easily distinguished from the
unprotected elements of the book, lines of code are not easily
26
distinguished from the unprotected elements of a computer program.
A court must somehow separate “idea” from “expression” in the lines
of code before it can draw meaningful comparisons between an original
27
and allegedly infringing program.
to include protection for computer programs as literary works when it enacted the 1976
Copyright Act: “The term ‘literary works’ does not connote any criterion of literary merit or
qualitative value . . . . It . . . includes . . . computer programs to the extent that they
incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression of original ideas, as distinguished
from the ideas themselves.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54 (1976). Congress waited to
provide express protection for computer programs until it had received word from the
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works as to precisely what sort of
protection should apply. See 5 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC
RECORD (Nicholas Henry ed., 1980) (reprinting the Commission’s Final Report and
Recommendations). In 1980, when it added the definition of computer programs to § 101,
Congress also enacted the current version of § 117, “Limitations on exclusive rights:
Computer programs.” An earlier version of § 117, enacted in 1976, provided that a copyright
owner would not receive “any greater or lesser rights” when the copyrighted work was used
“in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, and
transferring information.” Id. at 6.
26. Several authors have criticized the analogy between literary works and computer
programs. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic
Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1091, 1107 (1995) (stating that “the classification of computer programs as ‘literary works’ is
staggeringly uninformative”); Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The
Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 699–
700 (1999) (“[A] somewhat different vocabulary might assist us in properly balancing the
ultimate values we seek to advance. . . . I would rather begin the process of labeling the
protectable and unprotectable elements of computer programs with terms peculiar to the
realm of software.”); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2316–20 (1994) (pointing out that the
behavior of a program is more important to consumers than the text, or code, of the
program).
27. The rule that copyright law protects expressions and not ideas is codified in
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act: “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,
101–02 (1879). This rule goes back at least as far as Baker, in which the Supreme Court held
that the author of a book on a particular system of book-keeping could claim protection for
his explanation of the system, but not for the system itself. 101 U.S. at 101–02.
Two doctrines that courts have developed to deal with the idea-expression dichotomy
are the doctrines of merger and scenes a faire. Under the merger doctrine, an idea that can be
expressed in only one or a limited number of ways is said to have “merged” with its
expression, so that the expression is either uncopyrightable or receives only “thin” protection.
See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 13.03[B][3] (discussing the merger doctrine).
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In one of the earliest cases to deal with the idea/expression
dichotomy in computer programs, the Third Circuit concluded that the
idea of a program is its overall purpose or function and that “everything
that is not necessary to that purpose or function [is] part of the
28
expression of the idea.”
This sort of reasoning was criticized as
29
simplistic and not a good reflection of how a program operates.
Instead, courts today generally use some variation of the abstractionfiltration-comparison test, which the Second Circuit set out in 1992 in
30
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. In the first step of
the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the court breaks the program
down into a series of functionally distinct modules. In the second step,
the court filters out of each module those elements of the design that
are not protected by copyright: elements dictated by “considerations of
efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to [the function of the
module]; required by factors external to the program itself; or taken
31
from the public domain.” Finally, in the third step, the court compares
the remaining “golden nugget” of protectable material in the original
32
program to the allegedly infringing program.
The beauty of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test lies in the
fact that it mirrors the creative process of a computer programmer; the
test unpacks the “largely incremental and cumulative” work that goes
33
into designing and developing a program. This fact was not lost on the
Under the scenes a faire doctrine, expressions that are standard to a given genre or style lack
the necessary originality for copyright protection. See 4 id. § 13.03[B][4] (discussing the
scenes a faire doctrine).
28. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986)
(emphasis omitted).
29. Professor Nimmer, for example, asserted, “[t]he crucial flaw in this reasoning is
that it assumes that only one ‘idea,’ in copyright law terms, underlies any computer program,
and that . . . everything else must be expression.” 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 24,
§ 13.03[F][1]; see also Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“[T]he Whelan rule . . . has been widely—and soundly—criticized as simplistic and
overbroad.”).
30. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus.,
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834–39 (10th Cir. 1993) (examining in detail the three steps in the
abstraction-filtration-comparison test). The Altai court took the lead for the abstractionfiltration-comparison test from Judge Learned Hand, who advocated an “abstractions” test
for distilling “patterns of increasing generality” out of a play until a point is reached “where
[the patterns] are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of
his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.” Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
31. Altai, 982 F.2d at 707.
32. Id. at 710.
33. Samuelson et al., supra note 26, at 2330. The Altai court noted that the analysis
“resembles reverse engineering on a theoretical plane.” Altai, 982 F.2d at 707. “[I]t is
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Ninth Circuit when, less than a year after the Second Circuit decided
Altai, the court considered a case of first impression involving reverse
34
Accolade
engineering, Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.
programmers disassembled the object code in Sega’s video game
cartridges in order to discover how the games interacted with Sega’s
35
game console.
The programmers wrote a “development manual,”
incorporating the information they had discovered but leaving out any
36
specific portions of Sega’s code. Next, referring to the development
manual, the programmers created new games that were compatible with
Sega’s game console, but did not duplicate any copyrightable aspects of
37
Sega’s code.
The court held that Accolade’s reverse engineering of Sega’s
program constituted fair use, not because the “wholesale copying” of
38
Sega’s code itself satisfied the four fair use factors, but because
Accolade had a legitimate reason to study the unprotected ideas and
39
functional concepts underlying Sega’s code, and reverse engineering
necessary essentially to retrace and map each of the designer’s steps—in the opposite order in
which they were taken during the program’s creation.” Id.
34. 977 F.2d 1510, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992).
35. Id. at 1514–15.
36. Id. at 1515.
37. Id. at 1515–16. Accolade decided not to gain information about Sega’s program
directly from Sega, because to do so, Accolade would have had to become a licensee of Sega.
The license would have required that Sega be the exclusive manufacturer of all the
interoperable games Accolade produced. Id. at 1514.
38. The court did review all four fair use factors, but judged the first and fourth
factors—the purpose and character of the use and the effect on the plaintiff’s potential
market—from the perspective of Accolade’s new video games instead of from the perspective
of the intermediate copies Accolade made when it reverse engineered Sega’s games. The
court found that the first and fourth factors weighed in Accolade’s favor because of the public
benefit derived from allowing Accolade to market independently designed video game
programs that would run on Sega’s console. Id. at 1522–24. The court gave the most weight
to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work. The court quoted extensively from
the Altai opinion and concluded that many aspects of Sega’s program were not copyrightable.
Id. at 1525. The third factor admittedly weighed in Sega’s favor, but the court concluded that
this factor “is of very little weight.” Id. at 1526–27.
39. The law “legitimizes” the development of compatible software for two reasons.
First, the underlying purpose of copyright—“to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts”—is best served by allowing such competitive markets to develop. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8. Second, consumers derive tangible benefits from the “network effect” of widely
adopted industry standards. See Timothy S. Teter, Merger and the Machines: An Analysis of
the Pro-Compatibility Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1061,
1067 (1993).
[Compatibility] [1] encourages the formation of networks, through which users can
exchange files[,] . . . [2] prevents user ‘lock-in’ because users do not have to learn a
new user interface in order to switch application programs[,] . . . [3] provides each
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40

provided the only way for Accolade to do so. In essence, Accolade
performed an abstraction-filtration-comparison test on Sega’s video
game cartridges. Rather than filtering out uncopyrightable aspects of
Sega’s code, however, Accolade engineers filtered out copyrightable
aspects and retained what was for them the golden nugget of
unprotected material, which they could use with impunity to develop
games that were compatible with Sega’s console.
Of course, in the process of reverse engineering, Accolade made
intermediate copies of Sega’s programs, a prima facie violation of Sega’s
copyright. The court stressed that “there is no evidence in the record
that Accolade sought to avoid performing its own creative work. . . .
[Accolade did not] simply copy Sega’s code; rather, it wrote its own
41
procedures based on what it had learned through disassembly.”
Nonetheless, the court also noted that the holding of the case—that
making intermediate copies for the legitimate purpose of studying
uncopyrightable aspects of a program constitutes fair use—“does not, of
course, insulate [a defendant] from a claim of copyright infringement
42
with respect to its finished products.”
In other words, a reverse
engineer faces two copyright hurdles: infringement due to intermediate
copies and infringement in the ultimate product created. The defense of
fair use only applies to the making of intermediate copies. The
copyright owner of the original program might allege separately that
any new, interoperable program developed as a result of reverse
engineering copies protected elements of the original program. The
distinction between these two different claims of wrongful conduct
becomes important in considering the exemption for reverse
engineering under § 1201(f) of the DMCA.
Other courts have held that reverse engineering for the purpose of
accessing the uncopyrightable aspects of a computer program
43
constitutes fair use. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed its Sega
user with a broader choice of application programs and hardware, and as a result of
that choice, competitive prices[,] . . . [and 4] enhances competition by facilitating
entry into the software industry, as entrants need not develop an entire system of
their own.
Id.
40. In the words of the court, “disassembly of copyrighted object code is, as a matter of
law, a fair use of the copyrighted work if such disassembly provides the only means of access
to those elements of the code that are not protected by copyright and the copier has a
legitimate reason for seeking such access.” Sega, 977 F.2d. at 1518.
41. Id. at 1522.
42. Id. at 1527–28.
43. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1540 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996)
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holding in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,
another case involving video game software. In Sony, the defendant,
Connectix, reverse engineered Sony’s basic input-output system (BIOS)
software in order to create an emulator that allowed users to play Sony’s
games on personal computers instead of on the Sony PlayStation. Once
again, the court concluded that the defendant’s “intermediate copying
and use of Sony’s copyrighted BIOS was a fair use for the purpose of
45
gaining access to the unprotected elements of Sony’s software.”
Significantly, because Connectix developed a new platform for players,
rather than new games for players to use on Sony’s platform,
Connectix’s stance was more openly competitive than Accolade’s had
been vis-à-vis Sega. The Sega court had entertained the argument that
“video game users typically purchase more than one game. . . . [It does
not] seem unlikely that a consumer particularly interested in sports
might purchase both Accolade’s ‘Mike Ditka Power Football’ and
Sega’s ‘Joe Montana Football,’ particularly if the games are, as
46
Accolade contends, not substantially similar.” In contrast, the Sony
court recognized that users were likely to “substitute” Connectix’s
47
Virtual Game Station for Sony’s PlayStation console.
The court
reasoned that Connectix’s platform did not merely “supplant” the Sony
48
Instead, it was “a wholly new product,
PlayStation console.
notwithstanding the similarity of uses and functions between the Sony
49
PlayStation and [Connectix’s] Virtual Game Station.” Therefore, any
loss to Sony’s market for its PlayStation would be due to “legitimate”
50
competition.
There are two points to underscore from the cases that have dealt
with the status of reverse engineering under the Copyright Act. First, in
deciding that reverse engineering is fair use, courts do not focus on how
(finding the Sega opinion “persuasive in view of the principal purpose of copyright—the
advancement of science and the arts” and noting, further, that when reverse engineering
accesses original, copyrightable expression, that expression “may also be denied protection
where [the defendant’s] use is found to be ‘fair’ under 17 U.S.C. § 107”); Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“When the nature of a work
requires intermediate copying to understand the ideas and processes in a copyrighted work,
that nature supports a fair use for intermediate copying.”).
44. 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000).
45. Id. Sony did not allege that the defendant’s emulator itself infringed on Sony’s
PlayStation, and the court assumed as much. Id. at 604 n.7, 606.
46. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
47. Sony, 203 F.3d at 607.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 606.
50. Id. at 607.
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a defendant reverse engineers a program, but only on the fact that the
defendant must be able to do so. Indeed, when Sony argued that
Connectix could be faulted for making more intermediate copies than
necessary, the court held:
The “necessity” we addressed in Sega was the necessity of the
method, i.e., disassembly, not the necessity of the number of
times that method was applied. . . . Even if we were inclined to
supervise the engineering solutions of software companies in
minute detail, and we are not, our application of the copyright
51
law would not turn on such a distinction.
The court stated further that it would not “erect an artificial hurdle in
the way of the public’s access to the ideas contained within copyrighted
52
software programs.”
Second, even though courts dealing with reverse engineering under
the Copyright Act address each of the four statutory fair use factors, the
thread that runs throughout the analysis of each factor—the underlying
reason for the ultimate finding of fair use—is the policy argument. The
Sony court summed up the argument: “[T]he fair use doctrine preserves
public access to the ideas and functional elements embedded in
copyrighted computer software programs. This approach is consistent
with the ‘ultimate aim [of the Copyright Act], to stimulate artistic
53
creativity for the general public good.’” It is this balance between
protection and use of computer programs that Congress intended to
preserve by carving out an exemption for reverse engineering in the
context of the DMCA.
III. REVERSE ENGINEERING UNDER THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Legislative History
Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 ostensibly to implement a
provision of the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty (WCT), which requires that member states comply with the
following:
51. Id. at 605.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 603 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
432 (1984)). See generally Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1583–84 (2002) (discussing how
courts have “treated reverse engineering as an important factor in maintaining balance in
intellectual property law”).
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[P]rovide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies
against the circumvention of effective technological measures
that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their
rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that
restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized
54
by the authors concerned or permitted by law.
But in fact, the DMCA was the culmination of several years of effort on
the part of the government to figure out what copyright owners needed
55
to deal with the internet, the new “Information Superhighway.”
Copyright industry groups asserted that they needed better legal
reinforcements to protect against unauthorized access to digital copies
of their copyrighted material, which they analogized to “breaking into a
56
locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book.” The WCT anticircumvention provision was modeled after one of the earliest signals of
support the U.S. government gave copyright industry groups, the socalled White Paper, which was written by the federally appointed
57
Working Group on Intellectual Property.
Released in 1995, the White Paper outlined several steps the
government should take to help copyright owners, including the
enactment of new digital copyright legislation that would outlaw making
58
or distributing digital circumvention technologies.
Supporters and
opponents of such legislation had not yet reached a compromise bill
when the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) held a
conference in 1996. Bruce Lehman, at that time Patent Commissioner
and head of the Working Group on Intellectual Property, proposed that
WIPO Members sign a treaty that implemented the White Paper’s
59
recommendations. Ultimately, the treaty signed (the WCT) is similar
60
to the White Paper only in limited ways. But because the treaty is not
self-executing, it provided supporters of the White Paper all the more
reason to urge Congress to enact legislation that would provide
“adequate protection” and “effective remedies” against the

54. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, 71 (1997).
55. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 89–150 (2001) (tracing the
legislative history of the DMCA).
56. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17 (1998).
57. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
58. Id. at 230–34, app. at 1, 5–6.
59. LITMAN, supra note 55, at 128–29.
60. Id. at 129–30.

LEE ARTICLE - FORMATTED

2006]

6/3/2006 4:54:27 PM

RECOGNIZING A “FAIR ACCESS” DEFENSE

551

61

circumvention of digital technologies.
One source of tension between supporters and opponents of
implementing legislation in the United States was the question of
whether the new legislation should include a fair use defense to the
prohibition on circumvention. The White Paper had dealt with the
issue:
[T]he proposed legislation prohibits only those devices or
products, the primary purpose or effect of which is to circumvent
such systems without authority. That authority may be granted
by the copyright owner or by limitations on the copyright
owner’s rights under the Copyright Act.
It has been suggested that the prohibition is incompatible
with fair use. First, the fair use doctrine does not require a
copyright owner to allow or to facilitate unauthorized access or
use of a work. . . . Second, if the circumvention device is
primarily intended and used for legal purposes, such as fair use,
the device would not violate the provision, because a device with
such purposes and effects would fall under the “authorized by
62
law” exemption.
Copyright industry groups held to this line of reasoning and insisted that
the implementing legislation need not include any explicit fair use
defense for circumvention. Meanwhile, user interest groups—consumer
electronics groups, libraries, universities, encryption researchers—urged
Congress to ensure that access for fair use purposes would survive
63
enactment of the bill.
61. Id. at 130–31. Litman points out that U.S. law arguably already met the standards
of the Article 11 of WCT. See id. at 131.
62. WHITE PAPER, supra note 57, at 231.
63. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, and Online Copyright
Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2381 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 242, 245
(1997) (statement of Douglas Bennett, President, Earlham College, on behalf of the Digital
Future Coalition).
[F]air use safeguards our collective interest in the flow of information . . . .
. . . [Fair use] repeatedly has been recognized by the Supreme Court as essential to
the work of writers and others who creatively transmogrify the earlier works of
others in the alchemy that we call “Art.”
...
. . . [T]he DFC proposes that Congress amend Section 107 of the Copyright Act to
make clear that fair use applies to all copyrighted works, regardless of the manner in
which they are lawfully distributed or used.
Id. at 49–50 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright, Copyright Office of the
U.S., Library of Congress) (“[M]ajor area of controversy relates to the impact of section 1201
on fair use. . . . The Copyright Office agrees that it would be extremely undesirable to end up
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In the end, Congress did not include a general, fair use defense to
the three anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA. The first
provision enacted makes it illegal to “circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
64
title.”
The second and third provisions target devices that enable
technological circumvention, thereby making it illegal to “traffic in” any
device designed to circumvent either access-protection or copyprotection technology, if the device is (1) primarily designed for the
purpose of circumvention, (2) has only limited commercially significant
purpose or use outside circumvention, or (3) is marketed with the
65
knowledge that it will be used for purposes of circumvention.
Congress did, however, include several specific exemptions to the
66
three anti-circumvention provisions as well as a separate, temporary
escape-hatch mechanism for certain classes of works identified by the
Librarian of Congress in a “rulemaking proceeding” that would be
conducted during the two-year period after the DMCA was enacted and
67
again every three years thereafter. Legislative history confirms that
Congress crafted the exemptions and rulemaking proceedings in
response to the concerns expressed over continued fair use access to
68
digitally locked works. It would be inaccurate to assume, though, that
Congress intended the exemptions and rulemaking proceedings to be
with a world where fair use interests were not accommodated in an optimal manner.”).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
65. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1). Although there is no provision making it illegal to circumvent
copy-protection technology, the prohibition against trafficking in tools to circumvent copyprotection technology means that only people who know how to make such tools for
themselves will be able to take advantage of this “gap” in protection. See LITMAN, supra
note 55, at 144.
66. In addition to the exemption for reverse engineering, § 1201(f), discussed below,
Congress included exemptions for non-profit libraries, archives, and educational institutions,
§ 1201(d); law enforcement, intelligence, and other government activities, § 1201(e);
encryption research, § 1201(g); the protection of minors, § 1201(h); the protection of
personally identifying information, § 1201(i); and security testing, § 1201(j).
67. The rulemaking proceeding is laid out in § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(D). A list of the classes
of works currently
exempted under the rulemaking proceeding is available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201 (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
68. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998).
Given the threat of a diminution of otherwise lawful access to works and
information, the Committee on Commerce believes that a “fail-safe” mechanism is
required. This mechanism would monitor developments in the marketplace for
copyrighted materials, and allow the enforceability of the prohibition against the act
of circumvention to be selectively waived, for limited time periods, if necessary to
prevent a diminution in the availability to individual users of a particular category of
copyrighted materials.
Id.
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the only paths available for preserving fair use under the DMCA.
Legislative history reveals that Congress intended the entire DMCA to
embrace the balance struck in the Copyright Act between the interests
69
of creators and users of copyrighted works.
In the words of
Representative Bliley:
The Committee considered it particularly important to
ensure that the concept of fair use would remain firmly
established in the law. Section 1201(a)(1) . . . was crafted by the
Commerce Committee to protect “fair use” and other users [sic]
of information now lawful under the Copyright Act.
....
. . . Copyright law is not just about protecting information. It’s
just as much about affording reasonable access to it as a means of
keeping our democracy healthy and doing what the Constitution
says copyright law is all about: promoting “Progress in Science
and the useful Arts.” If this bill ceases to strike that balance, it
70
will no longer deserve Congress’ or the public’s support.
Thus, the congressional intent to preserve fair use under the DMCA
is clear. In the case of reverse engineering, as discussed below, the
exemption Congress carved out is ambiguous and crafted too narrowly
to fit the realities of how and why computer programmers engage in
reverse engineering. Nevertheless, courts would have the support of
legislative history if they were to interpret the DMCA to allow reverse
engineering for any reason that would be defensible under fair use.
B. Section 1201(f) Exemption
Section 1201(f)(1) of the DMCA provides an exemption for the
reverse engineering of computer programs:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person
who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer
program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a particular portion of that program for the
sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the
71
program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an
independently created computer program with other programs,
and that have not previously been readily available to the person

69. 144 CONG. REC. H108, 7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
70. Id.
71. Section 1201(f)(4) defines “interoperability” as “the ability of computer programs
to exchange information, and of such programs mutually to use the information which has
been exchanged.” § 1201(f)(4).
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engaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of
identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under
72
this title.
Section 1201(f)(2) supplements this exemption by allowing a person—
“[n]otwithstanding” the anti-trafficking provisions in § 1201(a)(2)–(b)—
to develop and employ the necessary tools to reverse engineer (again,
73
for purposes of interoperability). Section 1201(f)(3) permits a person
to make the information obtained under § 1201(f)(1) and the tools
developed under § 1201(f)(2) available to others (solely for the purpose
74
of enabling interoperability).
Legislative history reveals that Congress intended § 1201(f) to codify
the Sega holding:
The objective is to ensure that the effect of current case law
interpreting the Copyright Act is not changed by enactment of
this legislation for certain acts of identification and analysis done
in respect of computer programs. The purpose of this section is
to foster competition and innovation in the computer and
75
software industry.
Nonetheless, as it stands, the § 1201(f) exemption does not go as far as
Sega in allowing for reverse engineering. For one thing, the Sega court
held that reverse engineering for “a legitimate reason”—not simply for
76
the purpose of interoperability—constituted fair use. Although all of
the cases that have dealt with reverse engineering thus far have involved
interoperability, a case could come up when the court would need to
articulate a more general, “fair access” defense for reverse engineering
undertaken for a legitimate reason other than interoperability. The
statutory basis for such a defense and the factors a court might weigh in
considering such a defense will be discussed in below in Part III.C. The
remainder of the present section deals with three other ambiguities in
§ 1201(f) that potentially limit the application of the reverse engineering
exemption.
1. Scope
Even within the narrowly drawn limits of interoperability, there are
at least three ambiguities that courts must resolve to apply the reverse
engineering exemption. The first ambiguity concerns the scope of
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2000).
§ 1201(f)(2).
§ 1201(f)(3).
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 32 (1998) (internal citation omitted).
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992).
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reverse engineering. Section 1201(f)(1) limits the scope to “a particular
portion” of the program, the portion that contains the “elements of the
program that are [1] necessary to achieve interoperability . . . and [2]
77
that have not previously been readily available.”
There are two difficulties posed by the “particular portion”
requirement. For one, it is impossible for a programmer to know ahead
of time which particular portion of a program to examine. Indeed, even
after reverse engineering an entire program (or, more likely, a complex
78
of programs), it is not obvious which elements of the program(s) are
necessary to achieve interoperability. The programmer must take into
account material that did not survive translation into object code in the
first place, such as source code commentary and program specifications,
79
to determine compatibility requirements. The second difficulty stems
from the fact that even when a company has published portions of a
program’s code and/or interface requirements so that elements that are
necessary to achieve interoperability are “readily available,” the
company may not have obviated the need to reverse engineer the
80
program. A static examination of certain elements of a program is no
substitute for an analysis of the entire program as it is operating.
To resolve the ambiguity regarding the scope of a defendant’s
investigation, a court should read “particular portion” and “elements . . .
not . . . readily available” in conjunction with the verbs that accompany
81
these limiting words: “identifying and analyzing.” To identify and
analyze the elements of a program that are necessary to achieve
interoperability, a programmer must look at the elements in context.
Even after breaking the program down into a series of discrete modules,

77. § 1201(f)(1).
78. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 345 (“The programmer merely follows a trail
of logic through the software maze as it twists back and forth until a complete mental model,
and thereby understanding, is achieved. The maze consists of dozens, if not hundreds, of
different pieces of software, intermixed like a giant patchwork quilt.”).
79. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 14, at 899 (explaining that “reverse engineering
cannot tell whether a given feature is required for current or future compatibility; it can only
show whether a given feature is in current use or not”).
80. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 347 (“Even in those cases where companies
deliberately publish detailed internal information . . . such documentation has many
discrepancies; it simply fails to provide complete and accurate information about the software
as it really exists.”).
81. § 1201(f)(1) “[A] person . . . may circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of
identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve
interoperability . . . and that have not previously been readily available.” Id. (emphasis
added).
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the programmer must observe the signals sent between the modules and
then disassemble the modules—one instruction at a time, while the
program is running—in order to “identify” and “analyze” the elements
necessary for interoperability. Given the complexity of the task,
Congress would not have intended a court to second guess the extent of
82
investigation involved.
2. Tools
A second ambiguity a court must resolve when applying the reverse
engineering exemption has to do with circumvention tools. Section
1201(f)(2) permits a person “to develop and employ” the “technological
means” necessary to reverse engineer for purposes of achieving
83
interoperability. Section 1201(f)(3), then, permits a person to make
the tools developed under § 1201(f)(2) “available to others . . . solely for
84
the purpose of enabling interoperability.”
At least one court has
interpreted “available to others” narrowly to conclude that § 1201(f)(3)
applies only to programmers who share tools in the process of
collaborative reverse engineering and does not permit “public
85
dissemination of means of circumvention.”
The problem with interpreting “available to others” narrowly is that
interoperable programs that are “clones” of an original program
necessarily include a circumvention tool; the programmer embeds in the
82. Cf. Sony Computer Entm’t v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 605 (9th Cir. 2000)
(declining “to supervise the engineering solutions of software companies in minute detail”).
83. Section 1201(f)(2) states in full:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(2) and (b), a person may develop
and employ technological means to circumvent a technological measure, or to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure, in order to enable the
identification and analysis under paragraph (1), or for the purpose of enabling
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other
programs, if such means are necessary to achieve such interoperability, to the extent
that doing so does not constitute infringement under this title.
§ 1201(f)(2) (emphasis added).
84. Section 1201(f)(3) states in full:
The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph (1), and the
means permitted under paragraph (2), may be made available to others if the person
referred to in paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may be, provides such information or
means solely for the purpose of enabling interoperability of an independently
created computer program with other programs, and to the extent that doing so
does not constitute infringement under this title or violate applicable law other than
this section.
§ 1201(f)(3) (emphasis added).
85. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 320 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff’d, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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new program the instructions necessary for the new program to hook up
86
to other programs in the same way as the original. The instructions
often take the form of an authentication sequence, or “secret
handshake.” In Sega, for example, Accolade embedded in its new game
cartridges a verbatim authentication sequence it had discovered in
Sega’s games (twenty to twenty-five bytes of initialization code plus the
letters “S-E-G-A”), which allowed the games to hook up to Sega’s
87
console. Thus, if § 1201(f)(3) affords tools to be “made available” only
to other programmers, a company like Accolade, which embeds a
“secret handshake” in its new, interoperable program, faces a quandary:
marketing the new program may be tantamount to “trafficking in” a
88
tool that circumvents access, thereby violating § 1201(a)(2).
To resolve the ambiguity regarding the phrase “available to others,”
a court should consider the relationship between § 1201(f)(2) and
§ 1201(f)(3). It is clear that § 1201(f)(2) allows either a third party or
the programmer taking advantage of the exemption in § 1201(f)(1) to
develop the tools necessary for the job. Despite the use of the singular
noun in § 1201(f)(2)—“a person may develop and employ technological
86. There are two types of interoperability: “vertical” and “horizontal.” Vertical
interoperability allows a new program to communicate with the original program. Horizontal
interoperability allows a new program to communicate with other programs in the same way
as the original program—to be, in effect, a “clone” of the original. A single program might
involve both vertical and horizontal interoperability. Accolade’s new games, for example,
involved vertical interoperability with Sega’s console and horizontal interoperability with
Sega’s games. See Gary R. Ignatin, Let the Hackers Hack: Allowing the Reverse Engineering
of Copyrighted Computer Programs to Achieve Compatibility, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2042–
44 (1992) (discussing vertical and horizontal interoperability).
87. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1516 (9th Cir. 1992). Courts
generally have found such lock-and-key mechanisms to be purely functional, nonprotectable
parts of a computer program. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d
522, 537–44 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that to the extent functionality, compatibility, and
efficiency requirements preclude the possibility of making any material changes to a program
that functions as a lock-out code, the program is not copyrightable).
88. A district court recently granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on precisely
this point. The defendant reverse engineered the plaintiff’s software to create interoperable
software that allowed users to play games on a website that emulated the gaming service
available on the plaintiff’s site. The court held that because the interoperable software
(which the defendant made free and available to anyone) always sent an “okay” in response
to the “CD Key” information sent by a player’s game, the defendant had violated the
trafficking provision of § 1201(a)(2). Davidson & Assoc., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F.
Supp. 2d 1164, 1172–73, 1186 (E.D. Mo. 2004); see also Carla Meninsky, Locked Out: The
New Hazards of Reverse Engineering, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 591, 611
(2003) (“While the text of the DMCA implies that the reverse engineer may validly embed
the developed key into his new product and then offer the combination for sale, if a court
does focus only on the component key, this limitation could potentially expose the reverse
engineer to the anti-trafficking provisions.”).
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means to circumvent a technological measure”—the disjunctive
construction later in the sentence—“in order to enable the identification
and analysis under paragraph (1), or for the purpose of enabling
interoperability of an independently created computer program with
other programs”—confirms that the person might be either helping
someone else or engaging in reverse engineering (for the purpose of
89
interoperability) himself. The provision in § 1201(f)(3), then, which
allows “the means permitted under paragraph (2) [to] be made available
90
to others,” is redundant if “available to others” means only available to
other programmers in the process of reverse engineering the program. To
be sure, § 1201(f)(3) does underscore the possibility of a collaborative
91
effort to develop an interoperable program. But to avoid complete
redundancy, Congress might also have intended § 1201(f)(3) to provide
that a circumvention tool, where necessary, may be embedded in a new,
interoperable program that is marketed to the public. One of the rules
of statutory construction is that different portions of the same statute
92
should not be interpreted to be redundant. In the context of § 1201(f),
interpreting § 1201(f)(3) to allow circumvention tools to be embedded
in interoperable software not only avoids overlap with § 1201(f)(2), but
also makes the reverse engineering exemption correspond more closely
to the Sega holding.
3. Character
A third ambiguity that courts must resolve to apply the § 1201(f)
exemption involves the character of the interoperable program that is
the product of the reverse engineering process. Section 1201(f)(1) states
(and § 1201(f)(2)–(3) reiterate) that the interoperable program must be
93
“independently created.”
This is an oxymoron, because the new
program must, of course, be dependent on the original to the extent
they are interoperable. What Congress apparently intended by the
phrase is that the new program must not infringe on the copyrightable
aspects of the original. “Independently created” is a term of art in

89. § 1201(f)(2) (emphasis added).
90. § 1201(f)(3).
91. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 33 (1998) (“[D]eveloping complex computer programs
often involves the efforts of many persons. . . . [Section 1201(f)(3)] allows developers of
independently created software to rely on third parties . . . to develop the necessary
circumvention tools . . . .”).
92. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (“The Court will avoid a
reading which renders some words altogether redundant.”).
93. § 1201(f)(1).
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copyright law, meaning that a work possesses the necessary modicum of
94
original expression to warrant protection under the Copyright Act.
This interpretation of “independently created” in § 1201(f) is supported
95
by the legislative history.
The real ambiguity lies with the issue of whether a court must
establish the non-infringing character of the new program before or
after it applies the § 1201(f)(1) exemption. So far, courts have assumed
that the question of infringement is predicate to the question of
96
applying the reverse engineering exemption. In Sega, however, the
question of infringement was a separate inquiry following the question
of whether the defense of fair use applied to reverse engineering. The
court went out of its way to underscore this separate approach. After
concluding that under the circumstances reverse engineering was fair
97
use “as a matter of law,” the court went on: “Our conclusion does not,
of course, insulate [the defendant] from a claim of copyright
98
infringement with respect to its finished products.” By keeping the
analysis of the process of reverse engineering separate from the analysis
99
of the product, the court avoided making a false inferential leap. If a
programmer has a legitimate reason to study someone else’s program
and no way to access the inner design except through reverse
engineering, then, following Sega, the programmer’s making of
intermediate copies is per se legal.
Nonetheless, if the same

94. See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 294 (6th Cir. 2004)
(discussing how a court should filter out unoriginal, unprotectable elements of a copyrighted
work, “elements that were not independently created by the inventor,” before comparing the
work to an allegedly infringing work (emphasis added)).
95. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 32 (1998) (“The resulting product must be a new and
original work, in that it may not infringe the original computer program.”).
96. See Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1183–
85 (E.D. Mo. 2004). Most recently, in Davidson, the court granted summary judgment for the
plaintiff on the question of a § 1201(a)(1) violation, in part, because the court agreed with the
plaintiff that the defendant’s program was infringing and, therefore, the exemption in
§ 1201(f)(1) could not apply. Id.
97. Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992).
“[W]here disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements
embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for
seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law.” Id.
98. Id. at 1528.
99. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 332.
Both the EC and U.S. judges are making a false inferential leap that confuses the
end product with the development process used to produce it. If the resulting
computer software is strikingly similar to the original, then it does not matter what
the process was—the program will always be infringing.
Id.
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programmer goes on to make an interoperable program and a court
finds, through a nuanced comparison of the two programs, that the
programmer (perhaps, unintentionally) copied protectable elements of
the original, then the programmer will be liable for infringement with
respect to the interoperable program.
Congress might well have intended courts to follow a similar
approach in applying the reverse engineering exemption in § 1201(f). In
essence, Congress collapsed the underlying facts and the two elements
of the Sega test into a single, threshold question for a court to ask: Did
the defendant reverse engineer the plaintiff’s program with the
100
“purpose” of creating a competing, interoperable program?
If the
answer is “yes,” then Congress directed the court to apply the
exemption “to the extent” that the defendant’s program does not
101
infringe on the plaintiff’s program. The words “to the extent” invite
the court to make a careful, fact-intensive comparison of the two
programs at issue.
If Congress had intended the question of
infringement to be a threshold question, it would have opened this same
phrase with “as long as” or “provided that.” Arguably, by using “to the
extent,” Congress gave a court the opportunity, through ad hoc analysis,
to apply some measure of the reverse engineering exemption to an
individual whose “purpose” was to create an interoperable program. To
the extent the new program does not, in fact, copy protectable elements
of the plaintiff’s program, the defendant’s reliance on self-help measures
to gain access to the unprotectable elements of the plaintiff’s program
should be exempt from circumvention liability. To the extent the new
program does infringe on the plaintiff’s program, the protection of
§ 1201(f) is removed, and the defendant should be liable under both the
Copyright Act and the DMCA.

100. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2000).
[A] person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program
may circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to . . . that
program for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the
program that are necessary to achieve interoperability . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id. “[A] person . . . may circumvent . . . for the sole purpose of identifying and
analyzing those elements . . . that are necessary to achieve interoperability . . . to the extent
any such acts of identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under this title.”
Id. (emphasis added).
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C. “Fair Access” Defense
1. Rationale
Although all of the reverse engineering cases that have reached
courts thus far have involved a defendant who reverse engineered the
plaintiff’s program in order to identify the elements necessary to achieve
interoperability, legal commentators agree that traditional reverse
engineering practices encompass a broader range of purposes than these
102
cases indicate. A case could come up when reverse engineering would
be protected under the Copyright Act by the defense of fair use, but
would not be protected under the DMCA’s exemption for reverse
engineering.
Arguably, the DMCA leaves room for courts to develop an
affirmative, “fair access” defense to deal with such a case. Even though
Congress provided an express exemption for reverse engineering, it did
so with the understanding that the anti-circumvention provisions,
themselves, “fully respect[] and extend[] into the digital environment
the bedrock principle of ‘balance’ in American intellectual property law
103
for the benefit of both copyright owners and users.”
Accordingly,
courts may look to the anti-circumvention provisions to find grounds for
a fair access defense for reverse engineering for purposes that fall
outside the safe harbor of § 1201(f).
A similar effort to preserve the “bedrock principle” of balance
between protection and use in intellectual property law lies behind the
judicial development of the fair use defense for infringement under the
Copyright Act. Fair use originated in eighteenth-century England in
cases in which common law courts allowed for the “fair abridgment” of
104
works of authorship without the consent of the copyright owner.
In
102. See, e.g., Seungwoo Son, Can Black Dot (Shrinkwrap) Licenses Override Federal
Reverse Engineering Rights?: The Relationship Between Copyright, Contract, and Antitrust
Laws, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 63, 104–05 (2004) (pointing out that a technician
may need to “break the code for many purposes other than for seeking to achieve
interoperability,” for instance, to correct errors or to develop highly specialized software that
is not functionally interchangeable with the original program); Jeffrey D. Sullivan & Thomas
M. Morrow, Practicing Reverse Engineering in an Era of Growing Constraints Under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Other Provisions, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 4–5
(2003) (“Recent legislation aimed at protecting digital rights holders has been drawn
extremely—and perhaps unintentionally—broadly, and may call into question the lawfulness
of numerous reverse engineering practices that would previously have struck most technical
and legal observers as routine and beyond sanction.”).
103. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 26 (1998); see discussion supra Part III.A.
104. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an
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the United States, the first reported case to involve fair use was Folsom
105
v. Marsh, in which Justice Story summarized the inquiry:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to
the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the
106
objects, of the original work.
Although fair use went on to become, as one court famously called it,
107
the “most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copyright,”
courts have never questioned the necessity of the defense. Indeed,
every time Congress has revised the Copyright Act and expanded the
nature of the protection afforded copyright owners, courts have found
108
all the more reasons to advance fair use, because it “permits courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
109
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”
Congress signaled its approval of the fair use doctrine when it
110
codified the defense in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Yet it did
so cautiously, intending that the doctrine should not be “frozen” in the
Act, but should remain in the hands of the judiciary, so that it could
Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 13–22 (tracing the origins of
the fair use doctrine).
105. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Justice Story used the
phrase “fair abridgment,” not “fair use.” Nine reported cases later in the nineteenth century
do use the phrase “fair use.” Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use
Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 680 (1995).
106. 9 F. Cas. at 348.
107. Deller v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
108. Congress enacted the first Copyright Act in 1790. Congress revised the Act in
1802, 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976. See Loren, supra note 104, at 17–18 (“As more rights were
added to the rights granted to copyright owners, fair use was asserted more frequently . . . .”).
109. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d
Cir. 1980).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). We see the far-reaching influence of Justice Story’s
formulation of the fair use inquiry in the list of factors Congress included in § 107:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use . . . ;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
§ 107; see also Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105 (1990) (comparing the statutory factors in § 107 to Justice Story’s formulation of
the fair use inquiry).
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111

more easily respond to technological changes.
When Congress
enacted the DMCA, some wondered whether § 1201(c)(1), which
provides that “[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,
112
under this title,” signaled Congress’s intent that courts should extend
113
the fair use defense into the realm of digital circumvention. However,
a close reading of § 1201(c)(1) does not bear out this interpretation.
Circumvention is distinct from copyright infringement.
Section
1201(c)(1) only applies following lawful access to a copyrighted digital
114
work, not as a defense for obtaining unauthorized access to a work.
On the other hand, § 1201(c)(1) does underscore Congress’s continued
commitment to the judicial development of the fair use doctrine. This
commitment, itself, lends support to a parallel judicial development of a
115
fair access defense.
2. Precedent
The one court to consider the possibility of applying the defense of
fair use to a DMCA violation unequivocally decided that the defense
did not apply: “Technological access control measures have the
116
capacity to prevent fair uses of copyrighted works as well as foul.”
However, that case involved a bad actor, a defendant who was “viewed
as a leader of the computer hacker community” and who, in an act of
“electronic civil disobedience,” supported links to websites that offered
111. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67 (1976).
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use,
but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a
period of rapid technological change. [T]he courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended to
restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it
in any way
Id.
112. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
113. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) (“We
disagree that subsection 1201(c)(1) permits such a reading. Instead, it simply clarifies that the
DMCA targets the circumvention of digital walls guarding copyrighted material . . . but does
not concern itself with the use of those materials after circumvention has occurred.”).
114. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 13.05[F][6] (“Section 1201 . . . defines
the anti-circumvention as something distinct from copyright infringement. For that reason,
fair use is no defense to an action brought under Section 1201.”).
115. Cf. 4 id. § 13.05[D][4] n.513.13 (suggesting that when case law under the fair use
doctrine diverges from interpretations of the DMCA, the DMCA might be construed
expansively to cover non-exploitative uses of reverse engineering tools).
116. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff’d, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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DeCSS, a circumvention tool, for download.
Furthermore, the
defendant did not argue fair use for himself, but for “those who wish to
gain access to technologically protected copyrighted works in order to
118
make fair—that is, non-infringing—use of them.”
Thus, the facts of
the case are not on point with a hypothetical case in which the
defendant has reverse engineered a computer program for noninteroperability, but fair-use-defensible reasons.
Two other recent court of appeals cases offer more helpful
119
precedent for a fair access defense for reverse engineering. Both cases
involved defendants who bypassed the digital lock-and-key mechanism
in software that the plaintiffs had embedded in consumer goods in order
to market competing replacement parts for the goods. In both cases, the
courts ruled that the DMCA could not be used to prevent a legitimate
use of an otherwise accessible copyrighted work. And in both cases, the
courts did not base their reasoning on the fair use defense, but on a
close reading of the anti-circumvention provisions themselves,
particularly the words “access,” “protection,” and “authority” in
§ 1201(a).
In the first case, the plaintiff, Chamberlain, manufactured garage
door openers (GDOs) and used “rolling-code” software within the
handheld transmitters it sold with the GDOs ostensibly to prevent
120
criminals from “grabbing” the code and opening people’s garages.
The defendant, Skylink, marketed a universal GDO transmitter that
121
bypassed rolling-code software.
Because rolling-code technology is
based on a process that is relatively straightforward and familiar to
computer programmers, Skylink was able to develop its method for
bypassing the rolling-code software in Chamberlain’s transmitters
122
without actually reverse engineering the software.
Consequently,
Chamberlain did not allege that Skylink had either infringed its

117. Id. at 308, 312. DeCSS is a computer program that circumvents the CSS
protection system on motion pictures distributed on DVDs. The defendant in this case had
not developed DeCSS himself; thus, DeCSS could not take advantage of § 1201(f)(3). The
court concluded that § 1201(f)(3) “permits information acquired through reverse engineering
to be made available to others only by the person who acquired the information.” Id. at 320.
118. Id. at 304.
119. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
120. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183–85.
121. Id. at 1184–86.
122. Skylink Technologies, Inc.’s Opposition to the Chamberlain Group, Inc.’s Motion
for Summary Judgment at 6, 8, Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 292 F.
Supp. 2d 1023 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (No. 02-C-6376), 2003 WL 22961236.
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copyright or circumvented its technology, but only that Skylink had
123
In other words,
violated the DMCA’s anti-trafficking provision.
according to Chamberlain, Skylink was trafficking in a device that
enabled homeowners to circumvent a technological measure (the
rolling-code software) that effectively controlled access to the
copyrighted computer program within Chamberlain’s GDOs.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Skylink, holding that Chamberlain had failed to
show that Skylink’s universal GDO transmitter enabled anything more
than a homeowner’s legitimate use of the copyrighted software
124
embedded in Chamberlain’s GDOs.
The court observed that in
marketing its GDOs, Chamberlain placed no restrictions on a
homeowner’s ability to use replacement transmitters. Indeed, to do so
would be to go against market norms, because homeowners have “long
125
been able” to use universal transmitters with their GDO systems.
Lack of notice, however, was not the reason Chamberlain failed to
persuade the court of the merits of its claim. Instead, the court said that
Chamberlain had fundamentally misconstrued Congress’s intent in
enacting the DMCA.
The court focused on the language of
§ 1201(a)(2)(A), specifically on what it means to “circumvent[] a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
126
protected under this title.” The court explained that the “access” with
which the DMCA is concerned is intimately bound up with the rights
that the Copyright Act grants to copyright owners, that is, rights that are
“protected” under the Copyright Act and not rights that the Copyright
127
Act grants to the public.
Thus, the court declared that a copyright
owner could not “block all access” to its copyrighted work, but only
128
access that would enable an infringing use of the work.
As a corollary to its analysis of the connection between “access” and
“protection” in § 1201(a)(2)(A), the court discussed the notion of
129
authorization, which it said “is central to understanding § 1201(a).”
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000). Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits a person from
trafficking in a device that (1) is primarily designed to circumvent a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work, (2) has only limited commercially
significant purpose or use outside circumvention, and (3) is marketed with the knowledge
that it will be used for purposes of circumvention. Id.
124. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202–04.
125. Id. at 1183.
126. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
127. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1197–1204.
128. Id. at 1199.
129. Id. at 1202.
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Noting that the DMCA “defines circumvention as an activity
130
undertaken ‘without the authority of the copyright owner,’” the court
reasoned that in some instances, the requisite authority lies in the
131
Copyright Act.
“Copyright law itself authorizes the public to make
certain uses of copyrighted materials. Consumers who purchase a
product containing a copy of embedded software have the inherent legal
right to use that copy of the software. What the law authorizes,
132
Chamberlain cannot revoke.”
The second recent circuit court case that provides precedent for a
fair access defense also involved aftermarket replacement parts. The
plaintiff, Lexmark, manufactured printer cartridges that contained a
microchip designed to prevent its printers from functioning with
133
cartridges it had not refilled.
The defendant, Static Control
Components (SCC), designed a microchip that mimicked Lexmark’s
microchip and then marketed the chip to companies that sold
134
remanufactured printer cartridges. Lexmark alleged that SCC’s chip
135
violated § 1201(a)(1)(A) of the DMCA, because it circumvented a
technological measure—an authentication sequence or “secret
handshake”—that controlled access both to the Toner Loading Program
(TLP) located on Lexmark’s microchip and to the Printer Engine
136
Program (PEP) located within Lexmark’s printers.
In reversing the lower court’s entry of a preliminary injunction
against SCC, the Sixth Circuit found that Lexmark’s TLP probably did
not satisfy the originality requirement of the Copyright Act (the case
137
was remanded on this point).
If the TLP were not copyrightable,
130. Id. at 1193 (quoting § 1201(a)(3)(A)).
131. Id. at 1193–94. The court’s reasoning follows the reasoning set out in the White
Paper: “[I]f the circumvention device is primarily intended and used for legal purposes, such
as fair use, the device would not violate the provision, because a device with such purposes
and effects would fall under the ‘authorized by law’ exemption.” WHITE PAPER, supra note
57, at 231.
132. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202.
133. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir.
2004).
134. Id.
135. § 1201(a)(1)(A). “No person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.” Id.
136. SCC did not reverse engineer Lexmark’s microchip, but “slavishly copied” the
Toner Loading Program located on the chip and replaced the authentication sequence that
was also located on the chip with a different, publicly available encryption program that
enabled interoperability of its chip with Lexmark’s printers. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 530–31,
538.
137. Id. at 537–44.
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there could be no DMCA violation of the TLP because the anticircumvention provisions only apply to works “protected under this
138
title.” Even if the TLP were copyrightable, though, the court held that
the authentication sequence located on Lexmark’s microchip did not
control “access” either to the TLP or to the copyrightable PEP within
Lexmark’s printers.
Like the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain, the Sixth Circuit focused
on what it means to “circumvent a technological measure that
139
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.” The
court noted that the dictionary definition of “access” was “‘the ability to
enter, to obtain, or to make use of,’” and reasoned that the relevant
meaning of “access” in the case of a computer program was “‘the ability
to . . . obtain’ a copy of the work or to ‘make use of’ the literal elements
140
Lexmark argued that the authentication
of the program (its code).”
sequence on its microchip controlled access to its programs, because the
sequence controlled a consumer’s ability to “make use of” the
141
programs.
The court disagreed. In the court’s view, it was the
purchase of a Lexmark printer (and printer cartridge) that controlled
142
“access” to the programs. The court pointed out:
Anyone who buys a Lexmark printer may read the literal code of
the Printer Engine Program directly from the printer memory,
with or without the benefit of the authentication sequence, and
the data from the program may be translated into readable
source code after which copies may be freely distributed. . . . No
security device, in other words, protects access to the Printer
Engine Program Code and no security device accordingly must
143
be circumvented to obtain access to that program code.
The line of reasoning in these two cases creates precedent for the
argument that a person who lawfully obtains a copy of a computer
program has the “authority” granted under the Copyright Act’s fair use
doctrine to “access” or “make use of” the program’s code. In theory,
this authority places fair-use-defensible reverse engineering outside the
definition of circumvention and, hence, outside the reach of the DMCA.
That is, the act of reverse engineering, if done for legitimate purposes, is

138. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 1999)). The DMCA does not define “access.”
141. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 546–47.
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done under the authority of the copyright owner (via fair use) and
therefore does not violate § 1201(a)(1)(A).
In practice, a defendant is more likely to find success with the fair
access argument if it is couched as an affirmative defense, rather than as
a failure to state a claim. Reverse engineering is more complicated than
opening one’s garage door or replacing the toner cartridge in one’s
printer, and a court is likely to assume that reverse engineering involves,
by its very nature, the circumvention of a technological measure.
Raising fair access as an affirmative defense also has the advantage of
drawing a court’s attention to the parallels between fair access and fair
use. So, for example, cases that rely on the “reasonable and customary”
theory of fair use lend support to the argument that reverse engineering
that does not involve “transformative” access to the original program
(i.e., the creation of a new, interoperable program) might nonetheless
constitute fair access if undertaken for purposes that are widely
144
accepted or socially beneficial.
3. Factors
Just how far the fair access defense for reverse engineering might go
is something courts will need to work out on a case-by-case basis. A
court considering the defense should explore all the evidence at hand in
light of the purposes of the DMCA: to protect copyright owners against
the threat of digital piracy and, at the same time, to preserve the
“bedrock principle” of balance between protection and use in
145
intellectual property law.
The following discussion suggests three
factors a court should address. Of these, the first—whether the reverse
engineering in question led to what traditionally would be considered a
fair use of the original program—carries the most weight. Labeling the
use “fair,” however, should not end the court’s analysis. A second
factor to consider is whether an inherent limitation in the market led to
146
the defendant’s need to reverse engineer the plaintiff’s program. This
144. The phrase “reasonable and customary” describes the use of a copyrighted work
that, although technically infringing, is nevertheless fair under the theory of the author’s
implied consent to use of the work for a socially beneficial or widely accepted purpose. See,
e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550–51 (1985); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 11–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The “reasonable
and customary” theory of fair use lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from the
“transformative” use theory, under which the use of a copyrighted work that is infringing is
nevertheless justified because it adds new purpose or character to the original work. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994).
145. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 26 (1998); see discussion supra Parts III.A, III.C.1.
146. See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:
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factor recognizes that in every case that makes its way to court, the
plaintiff will hypothetically, at least, desire to control access to the inner
workings of the program in question. The court must assess the
likelihood that the plaintiff would, indeed, have been able to provide
access in a way that would serve the defendant’s fair-use-authorized
interest in observing how the program operates. Finally, the third
factor, the nature of the plaintiff’s program, calls for the court to
evaluate the level of copyright protection the program merits and, in
turn, the level of protection the program should receive under the
DMCA. Just as a program that consists primarily of functional or
unoriginal elements—elements that would be filtered out under the
abstractions-filtration-comparison test—would receive “relatively
147
weak” protection under the Copyright Act, so the same program
148
should arguably receive relatively weak protection under the DMCA.
The primary factor a court must address under the fair access
defense is whether the reverse engineering in question led to what
traditionally would be considered a fair use of the plaintiff’s program.
Fixing bugs and reverse engineering for research purposes would
qualify; reverse engineering to extract and duplicate copyrightable code
in a new program would not. The court should allow expert witnesses to
testify at this early stage of the case, first, to gain sufficient background
knowledge to appreciate the defendant’s purpose in reverse engineering
and, second, to grasp some of the subtle differences between programs
that may be drawn out by the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.
Even if the defendant did not create a new, allegedly infringing
program, the court will need to understand the inner workings of the
149
plaintiff’s program in order to analyze the four fair use factors. If the
court finds that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s program was, in
fact, fair, the time spent carefully evaluating the fair use factors will pay
Transaction Costs Have Always Been Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149,
156–60 (2003) (discussing “inherent limitations” in the market where non-economic values
are at stake and market transactions could never achieve the desired goals, so the law
“justifies” a defendant’s proceeding without consent or compensation).
147. See discussion supra Part II; see also Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992) (“To be frank, the exact contours of copyright protection for nonliteral program structure are not completely clear. . . . Indeed, it may well be that the
Copyright Act serves as a relatively weak barrier against public access to the theoretical
interstices behind a program’s source and object codes.”).
148. The Lexmark court did not stop at “relatively weak” protection, but stated flatly
that if the copyrightable expression of a program “operates on only one plane: in the literal
elements of the program, its source and object code,” then access to the program “is not
covered” by the DMCA. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 548.
149. See supra notes 24, 110.
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off as the case unfolds and the information gleaned helps the court
further evaluate the fair access defense.
A second factor to address under the fair access defense is whether
an inherent limitation in the market led to the defendant’s need to
reverse engineer the program. In some cases, the interests of the parties
may have been so opposed at the time the defendant reverse engineered
the program, it will be evident that, absent a court order, the plaintiff
would not have willingly provided the defendant access to the inner
workings of the program. Consider, for example, companies that
develop and market competing software. If one company suspects that
the other has infringed its copyright, in order to meet the “reasonable
inquiry” burden of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
company must reverse engineer the other’s software before filing a
150
lawsuit.
In other cases, the parties’ interests may not have been
opposed, but the defendant arguably would have been unable to obtain
the necessary information from the plaintiff in a reasonable, timely
manner. A defendant’s reliance on self-help to gain access to the inner
workings of the plaintiff’s program to correct an error, for example, may
be justifiable if the plaintiff does not offer ongoing technical support for
purchasers/licensees of its program. If the plaintiff maintains that, given
the opportunity, it would have helped the defendant correct the error,
the court should weigh other facts and circumstances, such as the
structure of the industry involved and the nature of any other contacts
between the parties, to assess the likelihood that the plaintiff would
have been able to meet the defendant’s needs.
A third factor to address under the fair access defense is the nature
of the plaintiff’s program. This factor overlaps, to an extent, the inquiry
151
under the second fair use factor.
The more original expression a
program contains, the more copyright protection it merits. Programs
that are dictated by practical realities are protected, if at all, only against
152
verbatim copying.
In the context of the fair access defense, a court
should go beyond measuring the level of copyright protection the
plaintiff’s program merits to ask what will be the consequences of
denying access to the inner workings of the program. If allowing
150. See Sullivan & Morrow, supra note 102, for a discussion of the tension between
the DMCA and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
151. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). “In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . . (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; . . . .” Id.
152. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 533–37 (discussing the level of copyright protection a
computer program may merit).
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unrestricted public access to the copyrighted expression within a
program would materially affect the plaintiff’s ability or incentive to
build upon that expression, such as creating follow-up programs, then
the court should weigh this factor in the plaintiff’s favor. On the other
hand, if unrestricted access to the inner workings of a program would
have little or no effect on the plaintiff’s ability or incentive to build upon
the copyrighted expression within the program, then the court should
weigh this factor in the defendant’s favor. The “deadweight loss” to
society that already occurs under copyright law will be exacerbated if
the DMCA is interpreted in a way that is over-inclusive, affording
absolute anti-circumvention protection for programs that the Copyright
153
Act would protect only against verbatim copying.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the DMCA with a relatively precise idea of the
protection it wanted to afford copyright owners against the threat of
digital piracy and a relatively imprecise idea of how to preserve the
public’s fair use of digitally locked works. The exemptions and ongoing
rulemaking procedures set out in the DMCA represent but two ways
that Congress attempted to compensate for fair use within the strictures
of the anti-circumvention provisions. Congress also left room for the
courts to play an active role, first, by applying the exemptions in ways
that are consistent with Congress’s express intent in enacting them and,
second, by interpreting the anti-circumvention provisions in ways that
respect the underlying goal of the Copyright Act: to balance protection
and use of copyrighted works so as “[t]o promote the Progress of
154
Science and useful Arts.”
Legislative history shows that Congress intended the exemption in
§ 1201(f) of the DMCA to codify the holding of Sega, a case that
involved a defendant who reverse engineered the plaintiff’s program in
155
The court in
order to create a competing, interoperable program.
Sega held that when a defendant has no other way to examine the
uncopyrightable aspects of a program and a legitimate reason to study
156
them, then reverse engineering is fair use “as a matter of law.” The

153. See Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for
Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 195 (discussing deadweight loss in the context of copyright
term extension).
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
155. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 31 (1998).
156. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Sega court reserved as a separate question whether the defendant’s new
157
Congress reduced the
program, in fact, infringed on the plaintiff’s.
Sega holding to a single, threshold question for a court to ask when
applying the exemption in § 1201(f): Did the defendant reverse
engineer the plaintiff’s program with the “purpose” of creating a
158
competing, interoperable program?
If the answer is “yes,” then
Congress directed the court to apply the exemption “to the extent” that
159
the defendant’s program does not infringe on the plaintiff’s program.
A court should not second guess the scope of the defendant’s reverse
engineering, because reverse engineering is by nature an open-ended,
exploratory process. Nor should the court hold the defendant liable for
violating the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA if the defendant’s
new program has embedded in it a device for enabling the new program
to communicate with programs that normally communicate with the
plaintiff’s, because this type of interaction is the essence of
“interoperability.”
If the defendant did not reverse engineer the plaintiff’s program
with the purpose of creating an interoperable program, then arguably
the court should go on to ask if the defendant’s self-help access to the
inner workings of the plaintiff’s program is nonetheless justifiable under
an affirmative defense of fair access. Recent case law suggests that this
defense might be grounded in an interpretation of the words “access,”
“protection,” and “authority” in § 1201(a) to mean that when a
defendant has lawfully obtained a copy of the plaintiff’s program, the
defendant has the authority granted under the Copyright Act to make
use of the program in any way that would be justified under the fair use
defense. This Comment has suggested three factors a court should
consider in applying the fair access defense: (1) whether the defendant’s
use of the plaintiff’s program traditionally would be considered fair use;
(2) whether an inherent limitation in the market led to the defendant’s
need to access the inner workings of the program without the plaintiff’s
permission; and (3) whether the nature of the plaintiff’s program is such
that it deserves relatively weak protection under the DMCA. Although
this sort of fact-intensive inquiry might complicate the court’s task, it is
necessary to carry out Congress’s express intent to preserve the fair use
160
of digitally locked works. It is also the only way for a court to reach a
157.
158.
159.
160.
Cir. 2004).

Id. at 1528.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2000).
Id.
See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202–03 (Fed.
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decision that is true to the realities of how and why programmers
reverse engineer.
DONNA L. LEE*

We conclude that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms of access that bear a
reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords
copyright owners. While such a rule of reason may create some uncertainty and
consume some judicial resources, it is the only meaningful reading of the statute.
Congress attempted to balance the legitimate interests of copyright owners with
those of consumers of copyrighted products. The courts must adhere to the
language that Congress enacted to determine how it attempted to achieve that
balance.
Id. (citations omitted).
* B.S. 1985, Southern Adventist University; Ph.D. 1992, Duke University; J.D. Candidate
2006, Lewis & Clark Law School. The author would like to thank Professor Lydia Loren for
her assistance in writing this Comment.

